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Abstract
There is a nite set of characteristics which can be present in a durable
asset adding value to it, and that are not necessarily part of it in the moment of
its adquisition. We represent formally how the expectations over the possible
future characteristics of these goods inuence its price, and get the conditions
for the formation of bubbles, which allows us to propose mechanisms to avoid
this kind of instinctive collective regimes. Posteriorly we extend our analysis
to consider the case of monopoly and of an m rms oligopoly producing these
kinds of goods, nding that the cardinality of the rm(s)possible plans of
production to maximize benets is the same. We show relation between the
assets prices and the cardinalities of the sets of suppliers, assets varieties
and entry consumers, with an indirect dependence on the rentlabor wages.
We model boundedly an analysis of the e¤ect of tendencies like corruption
on newly informed and non-bayesian probabilities that constitute the prices.
Finally, some extra provided mechanisms to avoid bubbles focus in reverting
badly programed rule of thumbs, to get back to the rightgreat rules respect.
Keywords: Non-Bayesian Expectations, Price Bubbles, ProtMaximization, Com-
petition, Corruption, Mechanism Design.
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Pisa and Florence). Im grateful with Carlos Hervés Veloso for helpful suggestions that improved
signicantly the content of the paper, and with Lionello Franco Punzo, Elvio Accinelli Gamba, Joss
Erick Sánchez-Pérez, Leobardo Plata Pérez and Edgar Sánchez Carrera for their incredibly helpful
support.
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1 Introduction
The formation of bubbles has been broadly and deeply studied, because of its impor-
tance in the living of the individuals. The need for explaining this instinctive, collec-
tive, and well legally dened behavior, has taken many authors to develop important
works which could be considered either a fraudulent, or a successful contribution in
the understanding of these phenomena.
Smith et al. (1988) study spot asset trading in an environment in which all
investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the
end of 15 periods, obtaining that fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price
bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value. Moreover, they also
observe that four of twenty six experiments, all using experienced subjects, yield out-
comes that appear to the charts eyeto converge earlyto rational expectations,
although even in those cases there are small price variations which invite scalping.
Lucy F. Ackert et al. (2009) conducted a typical bubble generating experimental
environment, designing a pair of assets that can detect both irrationality which
is the probability judgement error associated with low probability of high pay-o¤
outcomes, and speculative behavior. In their work they establish that aggregate
irrationality measured in one dimension (judgement error) is associated with the
aggregate irrationality measured in another (bubble formation).
Xiong and Yu (2011) examine a speculative bubble that occurred in 2005-2008
in Chinas warrants market, where despite being so deep out of the money that
there was virtually no chance of getting back in the money before maturity, 17 put
warrants would had been traded more than three times a day at substantially inated
prices. In their analysis they highlight the joint e¤ects of short-sales constraints and
heterogeneous beliefs in explaining the price bubble across warrants and across time-
to-maturity, nding direct evidence of positive feedback e¤ects in warrant returns at
short intervals of several minutes, and indirect evidence of smart investors riding the
bubble.
In the present work we deal with an objective view on the formation of prices of
durable assets that can be expected to posses more valued characteristics, where the
probability of presenting an extra characteristic depends on the purchased quantity of
these goods. This approach will allow us to identify the conditions for the formation
of bubbles, and to asses di¤erent mechanisms which can certainly avoid this collective
regime. Posteriorly we extend our analysis to consider the case of monopoly and of
an m rms oligopoly producing these kinds of goods, where the rm(s) can choose
among a vast set of di¤erent plans of production to maximize benets. Additionally,
as part of the di¤erentiated competition, we deal with the role of social tendencies
that can inuence newly informed and non-Bayesian probabilities, like corruption.
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2 Durable assets and its characteristics
N is the nite set of characteristics which can be present in a durable asset with
cardinality jN j = n. The set of characteristics of the asset is represented by a
coalition S 2 2N .
After an asset is acquired it could posteriorly gain new characteristics without
the need of spending more to acquire them. We dene the following set
H =
n
S : S 2 22NnfNg ^ jSj = 2
o
A function f : HQ! R+ gives the probability of acquiring other characteristics
A 2 2Nn fSg[fNg which a good with S 2 2Nn fAg[fNg characteristics has. These
probabilities can depend on the demanded quantity of the good Q. Moreover, these
probabilities are known to the seller and the buyers.
3 Demand, price, and expectations
What is the price of an asset with the characteristics S 2 2N?
We accept that the agents value each of these characteristics positively such that
are willing to pay more for a good with more characteristics. Moreover, we accept
that this price depends negatively on the sold quantity for a given set of charac-
teristics. Therefore, the demand for these goods without considering the arrival
probabilities is such that the price of an asset with the sure characteristics S 2 2N
is given by a function P (S;Q) which satises
P (S [ fig; Q) > P (S;Q)8i 2 NnS
for a given quantity Q.
Given this general property we can ask to ourselves, how do the probabilities
impact the prices of these goods?
Considering the agents expectations and their appreciation for these assets, the
price of the good with characteristics S 2 2N is given by
PS;Q = P (S;Q)
241  X
B22NnfSg
f(S;B;Q)
35+ X
B22NnfSg
P (B [ S;Q)f(S;B;Q)
when the agents take their decisions uninformed, however they could project the
value of the asset by looking at the other prices1, and the informed price2 of the
1If are available in the market.
2We indicate that the price is informed with the supraindex i.
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goods with characteristics S would be given by
P iS;QS =P (S;QS)
241  X
B22NnfSg
f(S;B;QS)
35
+
X
B22NnfSg
P iB[S;QB[Sf(S;B;QS)
which forms a system of 2n equations with 2n variables3.
4 The prot maximization
The producer of the asset with S 2 2N characteristics selects its quantity to maximize
prots, however before solving this problem it is important to analyze the e¤ect of
the produced quantity on the prices.
Instead of speculating about whether the decision of the buyers is informed or
knowledge anonymous, we can think, how the probability of the posterior arrival
of some characteristics depends positively on the sold quantity of these goods, and
thus, the inverse demand which considers the probabilities can have a positive slope
at least for a determined while.
This is, although the individuals who are willing to buy these assets could be
expected to decrease with an increase of its price, there is another e¤ect given by
the possible arrival of extra characteristics, that could cause an increase on the
willingness to pay as a response to the higher sold quantity.
The prot maximization is the following
max
Q
 = PS;Q(Q)Q  C(Q)
We accept that the functions are such that there is always an optimum quantity
of assets production Q.
5 About bubbles and its prevention
As we can see, as long as we nd expectations over these assets there could be bubbles,
because after its purchase, some or all of the extra indivisible characteristics could
3An example of the probabilities can be given by each single extra aspect j having the probability
1   1=ecjQ, where cj is a positive constant. Moreover, notice that it is implicit how many of the
probabilities given by the dened function f are zero, and that we could dene a di¤erent f to
consider applications where there is a possible loss of characteristics.
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not arrive4, which would leave the owners in disequilibrium, with an asset that has
a real lower value than the one that they originally paid5.
Therefore, we can write the following condition for assets when characteristics
S 2 2N
Possible bubbles condition:
1 > f(S;B;Q) > 0
at least for one B 2 2Nn2S. Further, the collective and well assigned probabil-
ities shall obviously satisfy the probability equilibriumX
B22NnfSg
f(S;B;QSi)  1
.
where QSi  Q and thus with certainty Si =  .
Notice that considering the alternative of prohibiting expectations means that
the possible bubbles condition would not be satised, however, is this condition
enough to produce, the possibility of bubblesformation under any situation? As is
well known, the bubble crashes cause contagious demand crises, but not the other
way around it.
Given these symptoms and core problems, in the following we allow to ourselves
informallyexplaining, di¤erent mechanisms or solutions that would avoid the forma-
tion of bubbles.
Selling in advance: This mechanism is based on the early and simultaneous sell-
ing by the producers who initially charge the more than a 100%sure value
P (S;Q), because are able to identify the number of customers which is fol-
lowed by the arrival of the sure characteristics, just in timefor the buyers to
appreciate them.
4If there were positive and negative expectations, these ideas could compensate each other
without winners, and the price of an asset would coincide with its real value!
5For simplicity we do not consider time di¤erences, and the possible arrival of extra characteris-
tics would occur right after these assets are purchased. A more complex trade ex-ante analysis with
uncertain delivery and private state verication, where it is veried how when the individuals are
prudent, the equilibrium is characterized by the fact that the agents consume bundles with the same
utility in states that they do not distinguish, can be found in Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-Beloso
(2007).
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Perfect forecast selling: In this case the rm monitors the individuals reaction
and demand6, and projects the characteristics that these assets will end up
having. Finally the rm sells the goods with the guaranty of the arrival of the
sure characteristics7.
Contract of gradual fair payments: In this case when the goods are purchased
only the value of its present characteristics P (S;Q) is charged, and the sellers
and buyers sign a contract which makes the buyers pay for the value of any
posterior arrival of characteristics. Since there could be posterior price uctu-
ations8, when the probabilities can be hardly considered, the decision of each
gradual fair payment could be addressed according to the evolving axiomatic
approach of the cooperative game theory, where central concepts such as the
core, or the Shapley value, are essential to understand the composition of a
value like the one that we deal with, independently of the agents personal
incomes and risk aversion9.
Example 1 The article 153 of the mexican law on the tax over the rent (Ley del
impuesto sobre la renta), stablishes that when the government estimates that an asset
exceeds in more than 10% the between buyer and seller agreed price, the total di¤er-
ence becomes a buyers rent, of which according to the article 157 of the same law,
20% has to be taxed by the government, (certain deductions at the end of the year
apply).
6 The case of monopoly and oligopoly of di¤erentiated assets
Independently of the way in which the assets are sold, we can communicate how these
goods with distinct initial characteristics are di¤erentiated10. Moreover, although the
posterior inclusion of any of the n aspects is not in control of the producer, it could
be possible for it to initially choose to entrepreneur the production which has certain
set of characteristics, another one, or the production of more than one variety of the
good.
6Which could be costly.
7To study an analysis on marketsequilibrium with perefect foresight see Petri (2013).
8For example due to a gain of popularity.
9To study factorial decompositions applied to other quantitative concepts namely income and
opportunity inequality, see Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2003), and Sánchez-Pérez and Rosas-
Martínez (2012) successively .
10Strict ways of the market communication are related to probably the implementation of certain
mechanisms independently of the present competitivity tendency.
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When all of the di¤erentiated goods can be supplied by a monopoly the maxi-
mization problem of this rm is the following
max
M
 =
X
S2M
M222N
PS;QSQ

S   C(QS)
where QS is the optimal quantity which internalizes the di¤erentiation with the other
supplied goodsvarieties that are contained in M .
It is easy to see that in this case there are 22
n
possible plans of nancially
developable production11. Moreover, if we consider how applying any of the mech-
anisms could alter the composition of the demand for these goods, then there are
(4)
 
22
n   1+1 possibilities of production for the varietieshoarder rm, and it will
choose the one which maximizes its prots!12 Finally, if the producers can supply dif-
ferent varieties of these assets with di¤erent mechanisms, the number of possibilities
of production in terms of characteristics is the followingX
M222N
4jM j
If instead there are k possible consumers , m rms, and the jth rm has exclusive
rights over a set of varieties of sure characteristics Sj 2 22Nn such that
Pm
j=1 jSjj =
2n, a single producers decisions will depend on the ones of the other rms. The
maximization of prots of the jth rm for given decisions of the other producers
(P j) is the following
max
M
j =
X
S2M
M22Sj
PS;QS(P j)Q

S   C(QS)
where again QS is the optimal quantity of each supplied variety, which results
from internalizing the substitutability between the jth rms o¤ered assets for a
given M 2 2Sj . If the rms are able to sell each variety using di¤erent mechanisms
simultaneously, each rm will be able to choose amongX
M22Sj
15jM j
11It should be noticed that the asset without characteristics  2 2N can also be produced.
12As it has been put by Rochet and Tirole (2001), in their Ramsey pricing problem applied to the
two sided markets, for a rm with a di¤erent objective, or when regulating one, the externalities of
its production plans can be taken into account.
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possibilities of production diversifying in terms of characteristics and ways to sell to
maximize prots13.
Since each producer and consumer, considers the others rms in the market, the
nal taken choices are the result of a non- cooperative game where each rm projects
the possible decisions of the other competitors, such that there are
mY
j=1
24 X
M22Sj
15jM j
35 = X
M222N
15jM j
possible outcomes in terms of nal available assets, which is exactly the same number
of these, possible outcomes for a monopoly that can decide among the same aspects
in the production distribution.
In an extra last addition, we must consider that although for simplicity we have
treated the variables in question in a simple way, its presence involves hidden rela-
tionships, and a perhaps more complete expression of the demand is given by
P (S;Q; ku(m(n); S); ki(m;w); S)
where the free entrepreneurship m that is determined by the available options n,
at its time determines the entry of the uninformed consumers ku, and also partic-
ipates with the wages w to attract informed consumers ki, from what we deduce
the innovative relation between the competitive income factors P and w,14 with the
agents determining the nancial state of the economy, and not the other way around,
. Moreover, the participation of k can denote behavioral collective regimes coming
from the consumers15, where given the obvious importance of the social institutions
treated by the evolutionary game theory16, as putt by Tseng (2006) for the nancial
applications, concepts like bounded rationality in terms of knowledge or computabil-
ity charge an important role. Furthermore, this mentioned role is the reason behind
adding the dependence of P on the suppliers of varieties m, and on the personal
resources w. And the constraints in question and the dependence on n avoid one or
the other relation to become an informed binding surprise
Example 2 The rm "1 Apartment of the rising sun" produces residences and
owns land in a place which has a mall close to it, and another one with a gym close
1324   1 = 15.
14k = ku + kn
15e.g. Rosas-Martínez (2015).
16e.g. Bowles (2006), Barreira da Silva Rocha et. al (2011), Accinelli and Sanchez Carrera (2012)
and Sanchez Carrera (2012).
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to it. Its competitor "Happy residence" owns land close to a park, and another close
to a gas station. The set of these aspects is
N = fmall; gym; park; gasg
We accept that not producing residences at all would have zero benets. The pay-
mentsmatrix (matrix 1) contains the prots considering the optimal quantity choices
taken by these rms on each di¤erent scenario, without considering the absence of
production as an option.
Happy resi;1 App of the rising sun fmallg fgymg ffmallg; fgymgg
fparkg 1; 2 1; 1 2:5; 1:9
fgasg :9; 2 2; 3 2; 2:9
ffparkg; fgasgg :95; 2 1:2; 3 3; 4
(matrix 1)
as we can see in the matrix (matrix 1), there are three equilibriums of best responses
correspondence. Moreover, from the payments we could intuit how even though these
goods are substitutes, supplying more varieties can attract more agents to the market.
Finally, employing all the possible payments if the rms also choose mechanisms to
sell each variety, would result in a greater and more complicated matrix, and we leave
such design as a meaningful activity for the reader.
We can nd a specic social tendency that results either from local or universal
cooperation motivated by decentralized interests, namely corruption. As it was ex-
posed in Accinelli and Sanchez Carrera (2012), there are many examples that show
how this so imitated behavior can harm a society. In particular applications that
this one, we must take into account how the information that is available could get
corrupted due to the so mentioned interest conicts, given the social tendency. This
is, the probability function should consider a dependency on what now the newly
informed and uninformed individuals believe. A perhaps more accurate probability
function is thus given by
f(S(k(m(n))); Q) (p)
The probability (p) thus captures the e¤ect of non-Bayesian persons and newly in-
formed agents17 k, that certainly depend on the rms which are determined by the
acquirable entries of its assets.
Despite the obvious di¤erence in the probabilities, we shall label a corrupted one
with the supra index F , and a corruption free one with a supra index A.
17The term non-Bayesian expectation has been previously employed by Shleifer (2000).
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A mechanism P (:) that performs as it follows
P (f(S(k(m(n))); Q)F ) = f(S(k(m(n))); Q)A
has an evident implicit domain, and is called anticorruption. If any, P (:) results of
obvious importance for the individual pay-o¤s. Verifying we get that the di¤erential
is
f =
 f(S(k(m(n))); Q)F ; f(:; Q)A  f(:; Q)
f(:; Q)A
From this we know that
f(S(k(m(n))); Q)F
f(S(k(m(n))); Q)
= (1 + f)
By looking at the big picture, we can deduce that we have what is the complex
system (s) with corrupted equations where is obvious that the corruption mechanism
it exists.
.
.
.
f(S(k(m(n))); Q)A = P ((1 + f) f(S(k(m(n))); Q))
.
.
.
(1 + f) f(S(k(m(n))); Q) = P 1
 
f(N(k(m(n))); Q)A

(s)
From (s) we draw that the number of equations is related to how strong the
corruption is, because as we mentioned, it depends on the competitive agents k and
m, which depend on n. This result literally means that the available possibilities
or characteristics that can be reached by the rms, could innovatory determine the
number of corrupted equations, given the domain of this tendency. The equations
in (s) depend all on the consumers k and it is straight forward to observe that are
linearly dependent! Finally, notice that the producers could again internalize the
externalities of their production to maximize benets.
A simple mechanism would be given by a simply additive strategy, i.e. P (:)
could just compensate the e¤ect of the corruptive mechanism P 1(f(k;Q)) such that
P (:) = f(:)f 0 + f(:) + (1  ) f(:) (a)
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where  = k
i
k
. Notice that we are implicitly assuming certain continuity on the
consumers k. Although a little bit formal, the additive strategy (a), contextually
denotes how the bad informationor corrupted expectationsmore less exampled
by actions like government bribing to get an illegal permit or commit fraud, could be
compensated, leaving always the already seen uninformed and non-bayesian proba-
bilities of the 3rd section. Subjectively, the particular information associated with
the probabilistic pointsquantities, can.
As seen before, the right proportion of equally skilled rival agents could be such
that the probability equals the corruption free one! How ever, we shall not focus
in those cases that we consider un likely to happen. Taking into account that the
corruption mechanism P 1could not be linear, we shall propose the common pool
information strategy. This mechanism consists in taking each of the smallest as-
sociable factors, and solving them as additive units one by one, until the components
are no more, to posteriorly leave the developed techniques, if not institutionalized,
at least publicly available in a common pool, where the possibly a¤ected agents can
see it. A simple example is appreciated in the following
Example 3 Given
P 1(f(:)) =
1
m
2
nw
PX
r=0

f(:)A
r
2
nw
P units or techniques would be developed18. After this tailor made matching
productive of anticorruption factors are assigned to its duty, they take care of the
potential damages and we are left logically with 2
nw
P
m
f(:)A. Then a nal technique of
division would leave us with a free of corruption system of equations (for n = 1).
As an additional observation, it can be noticed that given the possible hetero-
geneity of the ingredientsof the terms, less units do not imply a lower di¢ culty,
where exploring the correlation between the di¢ culty of solution and the individuals
harm would be an interesting exercise . As the matter of fact, solving one unit does
not necessarily involve a single developed procedure, because more additive units
can be contained in it. Finally, the pool will contain elements that can allow certain
pathologies recognition and strategies design.
As a nal characteristic appropriate to mention standing in this point, we must
recognize that a¢ rming that the corruption is always wrong is analogous to a¢ rming
that the rules are always great.
18Considering that the additive strategy has already been developed, such that the units without
any f(:)A in them can be eliminated from the equation.
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Another characteristic comes from the capacity to slavishly develop all the nec-
essary units to reform this way of looking at probabilities.
6.1 The non-rival agents
As it is usually classied in the eld of economics, there are two kinds of goods, the
rival ones that can only be used by one agent in a given period of time, and the
non-rival ones, which can be used at the same time by many agents.
In this case our concern goes to the presence of agents that can be used by many
at the same time, or non-rival agents, and exclusively to the ones that gain this
denomination due to the availability of their working anticorruption mechanisms. If
the population is given by the set H, we can intuit that the conditions for agents
k  jHj ^m  2jHj must be satised19. Non-rival agents, could be at certain degree
anonymous and randomly assigned to its duty20, with likely their successive super-
vision mechanisms. However we must consider that there are implicit minimal and
perhaps alternating requirements, and with this we of course mean that they should
be willing to develop the best possiblemechanism, and that there are minimal
cardinalities of S 2 2H them, for an anticorruption mechanism to be e¤ectively im-
plemented. And this is the di¢ culty given by the randomness and anonymity tools
in the mechanisms against corruption, when looking for the non-rival agents.
6.1.1 Who fears who?
The particular way of acting of the corruptive additive terms that modify the in-
formation, and the newly informed and the non-Bayesian probabilities, may evolve
given the provided weather.
Focusing on the individuals, if the programed rule of thumb Rx : H  
 ! L
of the individual i 2 H with a surrounding environment I 2 
, is such that if the
individuals have been programed to corrupt x = C, and x = A otherwise21. An
uprising characteristic of this function is that L is the set of all the available to
corruption ingredients. In this way, the collection of ingredients that make f
0
is
given by 
P 1; f
0

=
[
i2H
Rx(i; I) 
[
i2H
I2

R x(i; I)
and would ideally form part of the pool.
19In this vision the government is a rm.
20Jackson and Sonnenschein (2011) point out how Salvador Barberà showed that the randomiza-
tions can attack manipulations, in this way uncovering what can do in social decisions.
21The notion of programmable individuals has previously been revised and employed by Banerjee
et al. (2012).
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A hybrid way to look at a mechanism P is therefore looking for the rightbest I 2

. A Pareto unanimity would be reached if x =  x.22 Verifying game symmetry
in the Nash (1950) sense would be analogous to empathy development, and thus
reexively the human i in the right to , certain point could be programed equally to
any j 2 H .
If the required acting of the units does not show a simultaneous entry to action,
the non-solved terms may evolve or even modify its cardinality. Therefore as in a
non-cooperative game, randomizing the election, of the non-rivals would not be smart
, because the ones with a less bounded rationality or a higher R(i; I) are needed.
Facing this last by the model suggested characteristic, the best-possibleless-
punished entry of non-rival agents is threatened by, still anonymous and uncom-
municated corruptive terms. In other words, a required arising characteristic of a
right permutation of optimal pure and mixed strategies. A lucky programed pop-
ulation would enjoy the will advantage, of well institutionalized strategic common
pools.
7 Conclusions
It is likely to have value bubbles denition in these markets despite a given quanti-
tative comparison between the cardinality of the consumersset and the number of
suppliers.
Prohibiting expectations would leave us without a production of bubbles, and
considering di¤erent mechanisms like perfect forecast selling or selling in ad-
vance could avoid this collective regime that we, deal with, although its implemen-
tations could imply a costly and very specic design.
It is intuitive how the absence of bubbles would be benecial for the producer(s) of
these assets, and of course for the customers who dislike this collective phenomenon
independently of the particular wageincome levels and risk aversion.
The extension to the case of the monopolist and of the m rms oligopoly of
these kind of assets, was helpful to represent the control variables of a producer, and
the possible outcomes in terms of the nal supply independently of the number of
competitorsm and k, where the number of possible outcomes could change depending
on the available varieties for the producer(s), and the nal supply results from the
prot maximization which considers the diversifying possibility and demand for these
assets.
Finally, as an allowance, we leave open the question about which properties should
22A social rule that satises a Pareto unanimity satises an order relation that is preferred by
each individual. To read more on social choice see Condorcet (1785), Ostrom (1990), Plata Pérez
(1999), Arrow et al. (2002), Arrow et al. (2011)
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a demand for these goodsfunction have, in order to represent better di¤erent exam-
ples, because it implies a complex challenge that could not be avoided by concluding
based on usual empirical observations, like for example an observed monopsony of
very elastic nancial assets caused by a very skilled consumer.
8 How can we turn F in to A?
WILL social agreements perform weakly when facing costly payo¤s? It becomes
an uncertain due to the randomness of f 0 pressurizer challenge, to look for the right
channels that would enhance badly permuted non-rivalry reversion. We leave it com-
mon, where punishment is implied as part of the randomly static and so continuously
evaluated contract, pointing anonymously monitoring.
Noting that the rent distribution i.e. w does not enter in the programed rule of
thumbs, the non-rival agents will thus be found anywhere, where their certain capac-
ity constraint R charges importance in a world that presents now international links,
at least through markets that show particular contagious equilibrium behaviors The
challenge of the proposed mechanisms thus becomes dealing smoothly and e¤ectively
with these tendeny crashes, and. our found results on the variables dependency just
can be considered when expanding the pool and varieties n to reach a peaceful
Pareto unanimity rule
14
References
[1] Accinelli, Elvio and Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J. (2012). Corruption driven by
imitative behavior. Economics Letters, 117, October, 84-87.
[2] Ackert, Lucy F., Charupat, Narat, Deaves, Richard and Kluger, Brian D. (2009).
Probability Judgment Error and Speculation in Laboratory Asset Market Bub-
bles. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44, June, 719-744.
[3] Arrow, Kenneth J., Sen Amartya and Suzumura, Kotaro (2002). Handbook of
Social Choice and Welfare. Volume 1, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[4] Arrow, Kenneth J., Sen Amartya and Suzumura, Kotaro (2011). Handbook of
Social Choice and Welfare. Volume 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[5] Banerjee, Abhijit, Hanna, Rema and Mullainathan, Sendhil (2012). Corrup-
tion. Working Paper 12-08. Massachusetts Institute of Tecnology Department
of Economics, March.
[6] Barreira da Silva Rocha, André, Laurelle, Annick and Zuazo, Peio (2011).
Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous
GamesWorking Paper 11/54, University of Leicester.
[7] Bowles, Samuel (2006). Microeconomics: Behaviour, Institutions, and Evolu-
tion. New York: Princeton University Press.
[8] Condorcet, M. (1785). Essay sur Vapplication de lanalyse a la probabilité des
decisions rendues a le pluralité des voix, París.
[9] Correia-da-Silva, Jo~ao and Hervés-Beloso, Carlos (2009). Prudent Expecta-
tions Equilibrium in Economics with Uncertain Delivery. Economic Theory,
39, April, 67-92.
[10] Jackson, Matthew O. and Sonnenschein, Hugo F. (2011). Introduction to the
Special Issues in Honor of Salvador Barberàs 65th birthday, Journal of the
Spanish Economic Association, 2, November, 423-430.
[11] Lasso de la Vega, Ma Casilda and Urrutia, Ana Marta (2003). A new factorial
decomposition for the atkinson measure. Economics Bulletin, 4, September,
1-12.
[12] Nash, Jr., John F. (1950). Non-cooperative games: Ph.D. thesis, Mathematics
Department, Princeton University .
[13] Ostrom, Elinor (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions
for Collective Action: Cambridge University Press.
[14] Petri, Fabio (2013). Blaug Versus Garegnani on the Formalist Revolution
and the Evolution of Neolassical Capital Theory. Journal of the History of
Economic Thought, 36, December, 455-478.
[15] Plata Pérez, Leobardo (1999). Amartya Sen y la economía del bienestar. Es-
tudios Económicos, 14, June, 3-32.
15
[16] Rochet, Jean-Charles and Tirole, Jean (2003). Platform Competition in Two-
Sided Markets. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, June, 990-
1029.
[17] Rosas-Martinez, Victor H. (2015). On Behavioral Macroeconomics, Globaliza-
tion, and Economic Growth. Working Paper, Università di Siena.
[18] Sánchez Carrera, Edgar J. (2012). Imitation and evolutionary stability of
poverty traps. Journal of Bioeconomics, 14, April, 1-20.
[19] Sánchez-Pérez, Joss, and Rosas-Martínez, Víctor (2012). A Decomposition of
the Atkinson Index Through the Shapley Value. Theoretical Economics Letters,
2, December, 539-544.
[20] Shleifer, Andrei (2000). Ine¢ cient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Fi-
nance. New York: Oxford University Press.
[21] Smith, Vernon L., L.-Suchanek, Gerry and Williams, Arlington W. (1988).
Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenouse Epectations in Eperimental Spot Asset
Markets. Econometrica, 56, september, 1119-1151.
[22] Tseng, K. C. (2006). Behavioral Finance, Bounded Rationality, Neuro-Finance,
and Traditional Finance. Investment Management and Financial Innovations,
3, 7-18.
[23] Xiong, Wei and Yu Jialin (2011). The Chinese Warrants Bubble. The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 101, October, 2723-2753.
16
